In May 2019, she organised (with colleagues in the History Department) a Royal Historical Society Symposium entitled Contested Commemorations: Reflections on the centenary of the First World War, 2013-2019 , jointly funded by the Royal Historical Society and the Open University. https://royalhistsoc.org/rhs-symposium-ou-2019/ General and academic interest in the war peaked well before the actual centenary of its outbreak (the date of which differed, of course, depending on which country was commemorating it). Commemoration, as well as the way historians wrote about the war and the way their audiences received this new work differed, too, depending on the national context. In countries whose past has continued to be affected disproportionately by the events of 1914–1918, or where the war has featured largely in national memory (such as Germany and Serbia, for example), the nature of the debate showed clearly that World War I is not yet “history.” From Imperial Army to Bundeswehr: continuity and change in the role of the military in German history’, Review Article, The Historical Journal, 47, 1 (2004), pp.1-7

The Library's buildings remain fully open but some services are limited, including access to collection items. We're Now looking at the evidence we have on decision-making, particularly in Berlin and Vienna now, it seems to me that Berlin put a lot of pressure on Vienna at various points during the July Crisis, particularly if you look at the blank cheque – it’s not just a blank cheque saying yes we’ll support you, but it is the case of saying, but you need to do it now – it’s now or never – and there is a fear in Vienna that the ally might abandon them if they don’t appear strong enough. Does that in your opinion constitute to some extent German responsibility for the outbreak of war? Mombauer was a contributor to Michael Portillo's documentary about the causes of World War I, The Great War of Words, broadcast by BBC Radio 4 in February 2014. [4]The Fischer controversy, documents, and the ‘truth’ about the Origins of the First World War (2013-04) From 2006 until 2011 she was the secretary of the German History Society. [2] [ failed verification] As of 2014, she was a member of the editorial board of 1914-1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War. [3] She chaired the Open University department's Research Steering Group and the departmental REF panel until December 2013. [1] Media [ edit ]

The Origins of the First World War: diplomatic and military documents, Manchester University Press, 2013 Find out more about this book I also collated, translated and edited a collection of more than 400 international documents relevant to the origins of the war, many previously unpublished, which readers can use to discover for themselves the level of responsibility of each major power for the coming of the war. Challenging the popular rewriting of historyHistorians of the Great War found themselves in high demand in 2014. The looming anniversary naturally prompted publishers to commission titles that were designed to make a splash, cause debate, and spark public interest. The market was consequently flooded with publications that attempted to explain why war had broken out in 1914. Few could have predicted, however, the full extent of public and media interest in World War I. Nor could one have expected that the question of the origins of the war, in particular, would once again be paramount and the subject of widespread, heated debate. Germany necessarily occupies a central part in this account. Having been blamed for causing the war, it was here that most effort was expended to counter such allegations. However, the actions of other belligerents are also under scrutiny, and interpretations of the role of Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Russia and Serbia in the events that led to war are analysed. For the victors who assembled at the 1919 peace conference at the Palace of Versailles near Paris, the answer was clear: Germany and its allies were responsible for unleashing war in the summer of 1914. Yet, this so-called ‘war guilt ruling’, embodied by Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which obliged the losing side to pay vast reparations, did anything but settle the argument. Clark's account starts with the lurid description of “an orgy of violence,” namely the regicide of the unpopular Serbian King Alexandar Obrenović and Queen Draga in June 1903. Recounted in great and gory detail in a chapter fittingly titled “Serbian Ghosts,” this violent act marked the end of the Obrenović dynasty and the instatement of a new King, Peter Karadjordjević, from a rival dynasty. Footnote 33 Among the chief conspirators in the 1903 murder was Dragutin Dimitrijević, better known as Apis, who would later play a significant role in the planning of another regicide—that of Franz Ferdinand in June 1914. He “only narrowly escaped bleeding to death” in 1903 after having been wounded during the coup—which surely begs the first of many counterfactual speculations about the origins of the war. A response to the question of whether the assassination of 1914 would have occurred had Apis died in 1903 depends largely on what role one assigns to him in the 1914 plot. It was the choices that men made during those fateful days that plunged the world into war. They did not walk in their sleep. They knew what they were doing. They were not stupid. They were not ignorant. The choices they made were rational, carefully calculated, premised on the assumptions and attitudes, ideas and experiences that they had accumulated over the years. Real people, actual flesh-and-blood human beings, were responsible for the tragedy of 1914—not unseen, barely understood forces beyond their control. Footnote 95

Julikrise und Kriegsschuldfrage – Thesen und Stand der Forschung', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Spring 2014 With Clark's book such a publishing success, and many journalists and large parts of the German public now convinced that Germany had been exonerated and the slate wiped clean, there was, at least initially, a noticeable silence from historians who disagreed with this new revisionism. In fact, those who did not share the new view found themselves the subject of—sometimes vicious—ridicule, accused of nursing a “‘negative nationalism’ that clings to German self-flagellation,” or of being suspicious of “everything that contradicts the ‘achievements’ of previously attained knowledge.” Footnote 55 Fifty years after the Fischer controversy, being a “Fischerite” was suddenly an insult again. I published my book Die Julikrise in 2014 to present my research-based counter-argument to the centenary revisionist interpretations. I argued that all the major powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France and Russia) had some responsibility for the escalation of the July Crisis but that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments deliberately provoked this crisis without flinching at the possibility of unleashing a major war. Die Julikrise has sold more than 6,000 copies and is also available in Danish and Turkish. Crucially, the book, and other publications in history journals and public forums, have given me a platform to engage in public debate. Annika Mombauer's essential source reader translates, cross-references and annotates a vast range of international diplomatic and military documents on the origins of the First World War. It collects together documents which are newly discovered or were not previously available in English, drawn from a broad range of sources and countries into a single, indispensible text for students and scholars alike. the long controversy around the question, why did the war break out in the first place? Over the next four weeks, some renowned historians will share their research and analysis with you. And you’ll discover the devastating impact of the war on individuals and on whole societies. While this might seem like a sobering learning experience, it’s also a moving story that’s lost none of its fascination more than a century after it began.By contrast, few historians argued, until recently, for British responsibility for the outbreak of war. Britain's foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, has traditionally been seen as one of the few decision-makers who honestly worked toward keeping the peace in July 1914. Footnote 24 In fact, most historians agreed that London was the only capital where decision-makers were reluctant to contemplate war. Distracted until the very end of the crisis by the Irish Question, a war on the continent was, for Britain, only a golden opportunity because it could diffuse the domestic crisis: it is no exaggeration to say that a civil war loomed over the Irish Question in the summer of 1914. Margot Asquith's recently published diary, for example, clearly shows the preoccupation with Ireland during the fateful weeks of the summer of 1914, an impression confirmed by other contemporary accounts. “All happened in such a short time,” the Prime Minister's wife recorded on August 4: “On 30 th July everyone was talking of Ireland. The cry of ‘Civil war! Civil war!’ to which The Times and the Tories treated us every day has been stilled in five days.” Footnote 25 Sean McMeekin: History never repeats itself in exactly the same way. I see the appeal of these analogies -- that China is Germany. But, of course, China could equally well be Russia in 1914. The Russian economy was growing at a rate of about 9 percent a year in 1914. In fact, in many ways, Russia on the eve of World War I was a far better analogy for China today. Supposedly, even if you believe the traditional historiography the whole problem is the growth of Russian power and that was what was actually destabilizing Europe -- not the growth of German power. So, sometimes even when we try to learn from history, we draw the wrong analogies and the wrong lessons.