The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History

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I felt the author did not pay enough attention to the intellectual, emotional effect Alexander Dugin has on Putin. Putin's program according to the author is the continuation of Russia's imperial past from that of the tsars through the communist regime of the U.S.S.R. This is true in general because Russia has not had its moment of being a mighty imperial power like Great Britain, France and the U.S. It is also true that Dugin is supplying the intellectual and emotional frame work for Putin's vision of imperial power.

This book is in two halves, before 22 February 2022 and after. I needed the first part (but not the second) because after all the millions of words spouted forth by the journalists and professors, still my brain could not quite grasp exactly why Putin decided to roll his tanks. US supplies of sophisticated weapons such as long-range artillery systems have driven Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Putin has long railed against American hegemony and called for a “multipolar” world. Plokhy believes the war has taken us into a new age of superpower rivalry. Its poles, however, are Washington and Beijing. Moscow is China’s weaker and poorer partner. In zijn nawoord laat Plokhy de wens wellicht wat te veel de vader van de gedachte zijn als hij schrijft: “There are clear indications that the Ukrainian nation will emerge from this war more united and certain of its identity than at any other point in its modern history. Moreover, Ukraine’s successful resistance to Russian aggression is destined to promote Russia’s own nation-building project. Russia and its elites now have little choice but to reimagine their country’s identity by parting ways not only with the imperialism of the tsarist past but also with the anachronistic model of a Russian nation consisting of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. By paying an enormous price in wealth and the blood of its citizens, Ukraine is terminating the era of Russian dominance in a good part of Eastern Europe and challenging Moscow’s claim to primacy in the rest of the Soviet space.” (294) Intelligence failure’ of ‘error of judgment’? Of allebei? Poetin had in ieder geval beter kunnen weten als hij had geluisterd naar kolonel-generaal b.d. Leonid Ivashov, die hem als voorzitter van de Russische officieren vereniging in januari 2021, enkele weken vóór de inval, een open brief schreef: “The use of military force against Ukraine will, in the first place, put into question the existence of Russia itself as a state. Secondly, it will make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies for ever. Thirdly, thousands (tens of thousands) of healthy young men will perish on both sides, and that will unquestionably affect the future demographic situation in our countries, which are dying out.” (149)Critics who dismiss the bulk of the book as “just a competent assemblage of press cuttings” completely miss how crucial such work is. Without a chronological narrative of this war, more analytical work is impossible. Opmerkelijk genoeg relativeerde de Oekraïense regering de Amerikaanse waarschuwingen in die periode steeds. De realiteit was dat Oekraïne weinig opschoot met de Amerikaanse waarschuwingen, die het vertrouwen in de Oekraïense economie schaadden. De positie van Kiev was in de kern: 'Give us weapons, not warnings.’ A July photograph shows the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in the distance, across from the now-emptied Kakhovka Reservoir.

The invasion flowed from Putin’s warped imperial thinking. He believed Ukraine to be a part of “historical Russia”. In summer 2021, he published an essay setting out his so-called ideas. After two decades in power, Russia’s dictator-president had become increasingly obsessed with his long-dead predecessors. Portraits of Peter I and Catherine II “made their way” into the Kremlin’s antechamber. In Bucharest, NATO considered Ukraine’s and Georgia’s applications for a membership action plan, a roadmap to full membership. Although supported by the US and Eastern European member states, they were turned down after pressure from Russia, which made its unhappiness known publicly. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating. After a semi-democratic interlude under Boris Yeltsin, Moscow reverted to autocracy. Ukraine, by contrast, managed to preserve a competitive presidential-parliamentary system. Regional differences helped. Pro-reform nationalists in the west of the country had to find compromises with Moscow-leaning communists in the east. His chapter contrasting Ukraine and Russia’s different trajectories is fascinating Vladimir's region of Novgorod and Kiev was the genesis of Ukraine. In 2016, after his annexation of Crimea, Putin famously recognized Kievan Rus' as the origin of Russia and Saint Vladimir as the father of Russia. This recognition was in the form of a statue of St. Vladimir elected in Moscow, near the Kremlin. The "Monument to Vladimir the Great" is a massive 58-foot statue of warrior-saint Valentine, sword in one hand and cross in the other, overlooking his Russian landscape. It has become a meme for Putin.Poetin heeft het formele besluit tot de oorlog genomen in de Russische Veiligheidsraad van 21 februari 2023, waarvan een deel op televisie te volgen was. Volgens Plokhy heeft de Russische president het besluit om Oekraïne aan te vallen geheel op eigen doft genomen en was het hem om heel Oekraïne te doen en niet slechts om de Donbas. In zijn lange toespraak na het formele besluit keerde hij uitvoerig terug naar de thema’s van zijn historische essays van juli 2021, waarin hij stelde dat Oekraïne geen zelfstandig bestaansrecht had maar was gecreëerd door Rusland in de tijd van de Sovjet-Unie. (150-1) De overtuiging dat Russen en Oekraïners tot hetzelfde volk behoren, had tevens tot gevolg dat Poetin nauwelijks militaire en civiele weerstand tegen de Russische inval verwachtte (met uitzondering van een paar “neo-Nazi military subunits”). (154) Plokhy: “the entire military operation, underpinned by Putin’s belief in the non-existence of the Ukrainian nation and the desire of the Ukrainians to live under Russian rule, was modelled on the Russian takeover of the Crimea.” (154) Ukrainians in Kyiv, marking the 31st anniversary of their independence from the Soviet Union. Sergey Dolzhenkoi/EPA Plokhy is the foremost chronicler of early and modern Ukraine and the author of numerous books. They include The Gates of Europe, Lost Kingdom, The Man With the Poison Gun and Chernobyl, a compelling account of the 1986 nuclear disaster, which won the 2018 Baillie Gifford prize. His work is rigorous and objective, and also wonderfully readable and lucid.