The Hidden Origins of the Bank of England ...all great events have been distorted, most of the important causes concealed…If the history of England is ever written by one who has the knowledge and the courage, the world would be astonished. - Benjamin Disraeli, Prime Minister of Great Britain Modern central banks evolved from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries to satisfy several public needs: This book is bound to be controversial and engender strong reactions. Why would a seemingly arid subject matter such as the history of central banking and of the monetary system give rise to such strong reactions?

History is the most crucial subject of any educational system superseding science and the humanities in importance. Within its fabric, it holds the culture, traditions, beliefs, ethos and raison d’etre necessary for the continued existence of any people. If history is compromised by falsifications and omissions, which are frequently imposed by outsiders, then that civilisation will decay and finally collapse, as may be observed in the slow disintegration of Western civilisation since 1945. George Orwell expressed a similar sentiment in ‘1984’ when he wrote: The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of history.If you wish to have a real understanding of history - look for the influence of the bankers. This is the key to understanding the past, the present and the future. Alan Greenspan, chairman of America’s Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, is one of the most controversial central bankers of all. His tenure included one of the longest periods of low inflation and solid growth in American history—later called the “Great Moderation”. But he also presided over the buildup of risks that led to the financial crisis of 2007-09. Sebastian Mallaby (a former Economist correspondent and husband of our editor-in-chief) provides a deeply critical but ultimately sympathetic portrayal of this polarising figure. Stephen Mitford Goodson recently passed away and something about his eulogy inspired me to find this book. Rudyard Kipling’s poem If was included in the eulogy at his funeral and it immediately triggered my curiosity. Around 600BC Latium came under the control of the Etruscans. This lasted until the last king, Tarquin the Proud, was expelled in 509BC and the Roman Republic was established. The Etruscans, a people of Aryan origin, created one of the most advanced civilisations of that period and built roads, temples and numerous public buildings in Rome.

For any nation/state/society/community to have full sovereignty and independence in its affairs, absolute control over the means it employs to exchange goods and services must reside with the organs which represent the people, and must not be delegated to private individuals. The ‘scam’ of the money-lenders is the ability to literally create money from nothing, and then lend and accumulate interest on “credit,” and then re-lend that interest for further interest, in perpetuity, that creates pervasive, worldwide debt, from the individual, to the family, to the entire state. The so-called Global Financial Crisis raised the profile of central banks around the world. While books about central banks were, of course, published prior to the events of 2008-2009, none captured the attention of the wider public until the monetary authorities intervened on a massive scale and continue to do so well over a decade since the near collapse of the global financial system. A new set of books emerged, with titles like The Only Game in Town, or After the Music Stopped, which used a chronological approach to describe what central banks did as well as contemplating the implications of the shift from conventional to unconventional monetary policies. The approach of these books is largely descriptive and the analysis is largely rooted in depicting the evolution of central banking activities in select countries over time. The discussion blends a history of events that reflect the growing importance of central banks in the global economy together with the history of thought about the balance between public and private roles in carrying out central banking functions. As a result, private banks and their connection with monetary authorities play an important role in the depiction of the evolution of central banking. For example, we see how the emergence of clearinghouses led to the creation of “conventional” central banks via the centralization of this function at the public level. Hence, this function is treated as a “natural monopoly.” The same is true of the evolution of many of the other functions examined. Nevertheless, the author is careful to highlight how in some countries, such as the United States, the tension between a role for government versus a preference for a strong role by the private sector in carrying out certain financial functions can explain certain cross-country differences in how central banks evolved when viewed through the lens of the functional approach. It may also be noted in passing that the experiences of Venice and Naples figure prominently in the discussion.So yes, it is an informative, yet contentious book to read, but well worth the time. I do not agree with everything in the book and for this reason am indulging in the rebel-rouser, Yanis Varoufakis's, books as well. However, I expected some big differences, but I only encountered remarkable agreements between two authors who never met. But I'm still digging.

The first money used in Rome was the cow. This was not true money, but a barter system. Many early peoples used cattle as a medium of exchange. According to the legend of Herakles and the Augean stables, the cattle kept there, over 3,000 in number, represented the treasury of King Augeas. THE COPPER AGE (753 – 267BC) Money, being naturally barren, to make it breed money is preposterous and a perversion from the end of its institution, which was only to serve the purpose of exchange and not of increase...Men called bankers we shall hate, for they enrich themselves while doing nothing. I do not have the expertise to say whether Goodson’s findings are accurate, but I do know that the raw nerves he touches are on account of central banking and the monetary system created thereunder being at the core of the persistent profound and inhumane differences in wealth distribution within any given country, and among countries. For this reason, for several years, my Party and I have argued that South Africa should reform its central banking and monetary system, even if that means placing our country out of step with iniquitous world standards. The book, published in 2016, goes to lengths to understand Mr Greenspan’s psychology, not only his adventures in the halls of power. He was once a jazz musician, loves tennis and counts Ayn Rand as a major intellectual influence—Mr Greenspan introduced her to President Gerald Ford. It assesses what Mr Greenspan’s career might tell us about the Fed’s response to the mortgage bubble of the 2000s. Contrary to common perception, he was not married to simple economic models and had no fantasies about “efficient markets” or “rational behaviour”. Instead he had a keen eye for economic data and stressed the importance of finance to the economy before it became vogue after the crisis. His mistake, then, was in miscalculating how risks in the mortgage market could be systemically harmful. The book offers an explanation for this: over his career he had been able to prevent many bubbles from causing widespread harm, such as in the panic of 1987, so he paid less attention to the buildup of risks in the 2000s. However, he was less than decisive in quelling the risks he was aware of. As Mr Mallaby puts it: “Greenspan was the man who knew. He was not the man who acted.” Read a longer review by Martin Wolf published in The Economist. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960” by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz. This classic, published in 1963, provided the intellectual foundations for monetarism, a popular school of economic thought.

To help understand the central-banking landscape of today, it might be of value to revisit how such banks and monetary policy evolved through history. Three other elements about the functional approach adopted by Ugolini are also worth mentioning. First, the discussion is overwhelmingly centered on the European, British, and American experiences. The book is silent about how central banking functions evolved in Canada, Asia, or Australasia. Second, the chapter on the issuance of money does not discuss how history, or the history of thought, might inform the current debate about the digitization of money. Finally, the discussion of the monetary policy function glosses over the evolution of policy regimes, such as exchange rate or inflation targeting, preferring instead to focus on its role as a means of regulating and taxing the public to ensure something called monetary stability. Unfortunately, the latter expression is never sufficiently clearly explained. Nevertheless, Ugolini is correct to underscore the importance of examining how monetary and fiscal policy interact. After all, this is an issue that is very much at the center of the debate about the future of central banking. The early Roman silver coin was known as the drachma and was modelled on a coin used in the Greek south of the peninsula. It was later replaced with the smaller and lighter denarius. There was also a half denarius, called the quinarius and a quarter unit called the sestertius. Still later the system was supplemented with the victoriatus, somewhat lighter than the denarius and probably intended to facilitate trade with Rome’s Greek neighbours. Pierre Siklos is Professor of Economics at Wilfrid Laurier University and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His latest books on central banking are Central Banks into the Breach: From Triumph to Crisis and the Road Ahead and The Economics of Central Banking, co-edited with David Mayes and Jan-Egbert Sturm, both published by Oxford University Press This often-cited short paper lucidly explains how commercial banks create money and central banks influence that process. It dispels many common misconceptions about money. For instance, most introductory economic textbooks say that commercial banks lend out the money that savers deposit in them. In fact banks can lend money and create corresponding deposits even without savings flowing in–in other words, banks are quite literally creating “new money” when they make a loan and a corresponding deposit. This does not mean banks can lend with abandon. There are other constraints, such as the creditworthiness of borrowers, the interest rate at which banks lend which is influenced by the central bank and regulations on lending. Consider a consumer who buys an item from a vendor using money borrowed from a bank. The bank must settle the transaction with the vendor’s bank using reserves held at the central bank. If the borrower never repays the loan, then the bank’s reserves will not be replenished, reducing its ability to lend further.

Ugolini has written a compact history of the critical functions of central banks emphasizing how the forces of centralization spurred or prevented financial innovations. The approach taken is a fresh one and will be useful, especially to scholars who are interested in specific areas where central banks have played an important role in economic development over time. That said, does the book provide new insights into central banks and their functions? This is debatable. For example, while financial stability is often mentioned it is not treated as a separate function. This is a shame in light of the ongoing debate about whether central banks are possibly over-burdened with responsibilities. It is also relevant for the question of the degree of centralization of the various functions considered at the level of a single institution. Stated differently, greater emphasis by the author on governance matters might have helped. The 'scam' of the money-lenders is the ability to literally create money from nothing, and then lend and accumulate interest on "credit," and then re-lend that interest for further interest, in perpetuity, that creates pervasive, worldwide debt, from the individual, to the family, to the entire state. The cultural and material progress of a civilization will often relate to the degree by which it is free from the influence of debt, and the degradation that results when the money-lenders are permitted to abuse their power. Hence, Goodson shows that both World Wars, the Napoleonic wars, the American Revolution, the rise and fall of Julius Caesar, the regicide of Charles I of England, the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya and the revolution against Tsar Nicholas, among much else in history relate to this “Hidden Hand”. For those of us who were convinced that wars were only caused by geo-political and perhaps ideological forces, Stephen Mitford Goodson conclusively documents the insidious role of international bankers.Financial stability. While early central banks helped fund the government’s debt, they were also private entities that engaged in banking activities. Because they held the deposits of other banks they came to serve as a banker’s bank, facilitating transactions between banks. They became the repository for most banks in the banking system because of their large reserves and extensive networks of correspondent banks. These factors eventually allowed them to become a lender of last resort in the face of a banking panic. A later wave of central banks, e.g., the Federal Reserve in 1913 and the Swiss National Bank in 1907, were founded explicitly to provide financial stability. Money Creation in the Modern Economy. By Michael McLeay, Amar Radia and Ryland Thomas of the Bank’s Monetary Analysis Directorate. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Q1, 2014. This work provides not only a broad sweep of the history of economics over almost two millennia, but insights into how the problems of usury have been confounding and enslaving mankind since its civilized existence first began.